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This paper provides a model of boom-bust episodes in middle income countries. It features balance-
of-payments crises that are preceded by lending booms and real appreciation, and followed by recessions
and sharp contractions of credit. As in the data, the nontradables sector accounts for most of the volatility
in output and credit. The model is based on sectoral asymmetries in corporate ﬁnance. Currency mismatch
and borrowing constraints arise endogenously. Their interaction gives rise to self-fulﬁlling crises. Query 1
1. INTRODUCTION
In the last two decades, many middle-income countries have experienced boom-bust episodes
centered around balance-of-payments crises. There is now a well-known set of stylized facts. The
typical episode began with a lending boom and an appreciation of the real exchange rate. In the
crisis that eventually ended the boom, a real depreciation coincided with widespread defaults by
the domestic private sector on unhedged foreign-currency-denominated debt. The typical crisis
came as a surprise to ﬁnancial markets, and with hindsight it is not possible to pinpoint a large
“fundamental” shock as an obvious trigger. After the crisis, foreign lenders were often bailed
out. However, domestic credit fell dramatically and recovered much more slowly than output.
This paper proposes a theory of boom-bust episodes that emphasizes sectoral asymmetries
in corporate ﬁnance. It is motivated by an additional set of facts that has received little attention
in the literature: the tradables (T-) and nontradables (N-) sectors fared quite differently in most
boom-bust episodes. While the N-sector was typically growing faster than the T-sector during a
boom, it fell harder during the crisis and took longer to recover afterwards. Moreover, most of
the guaranteed credit extended during the boom went to the N-sector, and most bad debt later
surfaced there.
Our analysis is based on two key assumptions that are motivated by the institutional
environment of middle income countries. First, N-sector ﬁrms are run by managers who issue
debt, but cannot commit to repay. In contrast, T-sector ﬁrms have access to perfect ﬁnancial
markets. Second, there are systemic bailout guarantees: lenders are bailed out if a critical mass
ofborrowersdefaults.Theﬁrstpartofthepaperderivesoptimalinvestmentandﬁnancingchoices
for the N-sector when these imperfections are present. We show that both borrowing constraints
and a risky currency mismatch of assets and liabilities arise in equilibrium. Moreover, even in
a world with no exogenous shocks, self-fulﬁlling crises can occur. The second part of the paper
considers a dynamic small open economy where our two assumptions hold, and it provides an
account of a complete boom-bust episode.
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The emergence of both real exchange rate risk and systemic credit risk in our model is self-
fulﬁlling. On the one hand, if N-sector managers expect the real exchange rate to ﬂuctuate, they
ﬁnd it optimal to create a “currency mismatch” and thereby risk going bankrupt. Indeed, suppose
managers believe that a real depreciation could occur. With guarantees in place, it makes sense
for them to coordinate exposure to the real exchange rate by denominating debt in T-goods. This
creates a currency mismatch: while ﬁrms’ revenue depends on the real exchange rate, their debt
obligations do not. However, if all ﬁrms go bankrupt in case of a depreciation, they trigger a
bailout and shift debt repayment to the taxpayer. This increases ex ante proﬁts.
On the other hand, once there is a currency mismatch, a balance sheet effect validates
the initial expectations of real exchange rate ﬂuctuations. This effect is due to the managerial
commitment problem. Indeed, since the guarantees are systemic, they do not insure lenders
against idiosyncratic default by an individual ﬁrm. To credibly abstain from stealing, an
individual manager must therefore respect a borrowing constraint.1 As a result, N-sector
investment depends on N-sector cash ﬂow—a balance sheet effect. The currency mismatch
actually relaxes the borrowing constraint and ampliﬁes the balance sheet effect: since the
government commits to a bailout, the manager can commit to pay lenders at least in states where
he defaults and a bailout takes place. Guarantees thus permit more leverage.
A self-fulﬁlling crisis occurs as follows. Suppose the price of N-goods falls. N-sector cash
ﬂow also falls and there are widespread defaults. Due to the balance sheet effect, investment
demandbytheN-sectorcollapses.IftheN-sectorisanimportantenoughbuyerinitsownmarket,
the price must indeed fall to clear the market. It follows that managers were correct all along in
expecting the possibility of a depreciation. Of course, the mechanism can only work if the risk of
crisis is not so high that managers’ plans become unproﬁtable: self-fulﬁlling crises must be rare
events if they are to occur in equilibrium.2
The second part of the paper characterizes the dynamics of boom-bust episodes. Here we
make a third important assumption: the demand for N-goods by other sectors is expected to
increase at some point in the future. These expectations could arise, for example, because of a
reform. They kick off a boom during which the size of the N-sector and the relative price of its
output rise hand-in-hand. Indeed, an increase in output not only increases supply of N-goods,
but also N-sector cash ﬂow. As long as prices are expected to rise further, N-sector investment
is proﬁtable and the increase in cash ﬂow stimulates investment demand for N-goods. Future
prices are in turn high because higher investment increases future output and cash ﬂow and so
on. This “self-feeding” investment boom is sustainable because the eventual increase in demand
from other sectors ensures that the N-sector can repay debt accumulated along the way.
Since bailout guarantees amplify the balance sheet effect, they strengthen the boom. The
use of T-denominated debt that is effectively subsidized by taxpayers allows managers to borrow
more. Bailout guarantees thus counteract the underinvestment problem otherwise faced by the
borrowing-constrained N-sector. However, faster growth comes at a cost: the economy becomes
vulnerable to crises. Once the N-sector is large enough, the self-fulﬁlling meltdown described
above can occur. The main result of the paper is the existence of a sunspot equilibrium in which
lending booms end-rarely-in crises that involve a real depreciation and widespread defaults.
These crises have persistent effects on N-output: it subsequently takes time for the N-sector
to accumulate internal funds.
1. For this result, it also matters that agents cannot write contingent contracts that promise large payments in
bailout states only.
2. The explicit treatment of risk is crucial here. If crises were unanticipated, ﬁrms would be indifferent between
T- and N-debt. We would thus need to assume the currency mismatch. Only if crises are anticipated can we rationalize
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According to our model, the “fundamentals” responsible for recent crises are found in
ﬁnancial markets and their regulation. Crises need not be triggered by exogenous shocks, such
as productivity shocks. They are also “real”: the nature of the nominal exchange rate regime
is irrelevant. Instead, both systemic guarantees and borrowing constraints in the N-sector play
an essential role. If there were only guarantees, self-fulﬁlling crises could not occur because
managers could easily borrow in case of a real depreciation. Conversely, if there were no
guarantees, managers would have no incentive to create the currency mismatch that is required
for crises to occur. Indeed, in the presence of bankruptcy costs, they would instead prefer to
hedge real exchange rate risk by denominating their debt in nontradables.
Our paper is related to a number of other recent “third generation” models of ﬁnancial
crises. These models share the feature that ﬁnancial market distortions faced by the private sector
play an important role. In particular, some existing models contain either bailout guarantees or
a managerial commitment problem. To our knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst to analyse both
distortions in an explicit microeconomic setting and to show that their interaction is nontrivial
and important for understanding crises. Moreover, our focus on sectoral asymmetries leads us to
provide a new account of the dynamics of boom-bust episodes. The related literature is discussed
in more detail in Section 8.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the stylized facts.
Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 characterizes the ﬁnancial structure of the economy.
Section 5 considers the crisis mechanism. Section 6 characterizes equilibrium dynamics.
Section 7 relates the times series generated by the model to the stylized facts. Section 8 discusses
related literature. Section 9 concludes. All proofs are collected in an Appendix.
2. STYLIZED FACTS
The stylized facts on boom-bust episodes described in the introduction have been documented
in several papers.3 Here we illustrate them through an event study on a set of eleven frequently
studied countries over the period 1980–1999. The countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Finland,
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Sweden, and Thailand. Query 2
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Figure 1 shows the typical behaviour of several macroeconomic variables around the crises.
The middle line in each panel represents the average deviation, relative to tranquil times, for the
variable considered. It is apparent that the typical crisis was preceded by a real appreciation and
a lending boom during which bank credit to the private sector was growing unusually fast. In
addition, the N-sector was growing faster than the T-sector.
During the typical crisis, the real exchange rate depreciates and real credit growth falls
drastically, reﬂecting problems in the banking system. The recession following the crisis was
usually short-lived, while the slump in credit was more drawn out. In Figure 1, GDP growth
recovers to its tranquil time mean by period t + 3, that is, three years after the crisis. In contrast,
real credit growth at t + 3 is signiﬁcantly lower than during tranquil times, and the gap seems
to be widening. Sectoral asymmetries are also apparent during and after the crisis: the N-sector
falls harder than the T-sector during the crisis and recuperates more sluggishly afterwards. The
N-to-T output ratio actually falls monotonically during the whole bust phase.
Interestingly, along a boom-bust episode investment exhibits quite large (and statistically
signiﬁcant) deviations from tranquil times, while consumption deviations are very mild and
insigniﬁcant. Figure 1 also shows that there is no signiﬁcant deterioration in the terms of trade in
3. See Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996), Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999), Kaminski and Reinhart (1999),
Krueger and Tornell (2000) and Gourinchas, Landerretche and Valdes (2001).4 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
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FIGURE 1
the year prior to a crisis. This fact suggests that among the usual suspects there is no evidence of
a large exogenous shock that rocks the boat and generates a crisis.
WewouldliketoemphasizethatalthoughalmosteverycrisishasbeenprecededbyalendingSCHNEIDER & TORNELL 5
boom, the converse is not true. Gourinchas et al. (2001) ﬁnd that the typical lending boom does
not end in crisis, but with a soft landing. That is, crises are rare events. Finally, the properties of
a boom-bust episode do not depend on a particular exchange rate regime. In particular, Tornell
and Westermann (2002) ﬁnd that the macroeconomic patterns along a boom-bust episode under
ﬁxed exchange rates are not signiﬁcantly different from the patterns under non-ﬁxed regimes.
3. THE MODEL
We consider a small open economy which exists for T periods. There are two goods: an
internationally tradable (T) good, which is the numeraire, and a nontradable (N) good. The only
source of uncertainty is a sunspot variable σt which is i.i.d. and takes values in {good, bad}.
The “good” state occurs with probability α. We denote the inverse of the real exchange rate by
pt =
pN,t
pT,t , and by pt+1 and pt+1 the values that pt+1 is expected to take on in the good and bad
state, respectively.4 There are three types of agents: foreign investors, N-sector managers and
consumers.
3.1. Foreign investors
Foreign investors are risk neutral and have “deep pockets”: they lend any amount of funds as long
as they are promised the riskless world interest rate in expected value. They also issue default-
free bonds: an N-bond and a T-bond. The T-bond pays one unit of the T-good next period and
trades today at a price β := 1
1+r, where r is the constant world interest rate. The N-bond pays
pt+1 units of the T-good next period, and trades today at a price 1
1+rn
t . Since the sunspot takes
only two values, the two bonds complete the market. In addition, the existence of risk neutral
deep pocketed investors will imply that uncovered interest parity holds in equilibrium:
(1 + rn
t )pe
t+1 = 1 + r, where pe
t+1 := αpt+1 + (1 − α)p
t+1. (3.1)
More generally, the price of every payoff stream will simply be its discounted expected value.
3.2. Nontradables sector
There is a continuum of N-sector ﬁrms of measure one. Since we will impose symmetry, we
consider a representative ﬁrm. It has access to a linear technology that produces N-goods at time
t + 1 by investing N-goods at t:
qt+1 = θIt.
Financing. To ﬁnance investment, the ﬁrm can use internal funds, wt, or issue standard
debt. Debt is short-term and may be denominated in T-goods or in N-goods. If the ﬁrm issues
T-bonds (N-bonds) worth a total of bt(bn
t ) units of T-goods at time t, it promises to repay
(1 + ρt)bt (pt+1(1 + ρn
t )bn
t ) units of T-goods at time t + 1. The ﬁrm may also purchase T-
and N-default-free bonds (st,sn
t ) that will repay (1 + r)st and pt+1(1 + rn
t )sn
t at t + 1.5
The ﬁrm’s budget constraint at time t, measured in T-goods, is
ptIt + st + sn
t = wt + bt + bn
t . (3.2)
4. That is, pt+1 = E[pt+1 | It,{σt+1 = good}] and pt+1 = E[pt+1 | It,{σt+1 = bad}], where It is the
information available at t.
5. Using these instruments, the ﬁrm can generate any state-contingent payoff. In particular, it can choose to hedge
all real exchange rate risk by denominating all debt in N-goods (b = 0). In contrast, a “risky currency mismatch” can be
created by setting b > s and bn = sn = 0.6 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
At time t + 1 proﬁts πt+1 are equal to gross returns Gt+1 minus the debt burden:
Gt+1 := pt+1θIt + (1 + r)st + pt+1(1 + rn
t )sn
t ,
πt+1(pt+1) := Gt+1 − (1 + ρt)bt − pt+1(1 + ρn
t )bn
t .
A ﬁrm is insolvent if proﬁts are negative (πt+1 < 0). In this case all of the ﬁrm’s gross returns
Gt+1 are dissipated.
Diversion. The ﬁrm’s investment and ﬁnancing decision are made by overlapping
generations of managers. The time t manager inherits a cash position wt from his predecessor.
He then issues bonds and invests. In addition, he can make arrangements to divert the returns of
the ﬁrm. Setting up a diversion scheme requires a non-pecuniary diversion cost h < 1 + r per
unit of the ﬁrm’s assets. Once the scheme is in place, the manager can divert the gross returns
at date t + 1, provided that the ﬁrm is solvent. The goal of every manager is to maximize next
period’s expected proﬁts net of ex ante diversion costs.6 Finally, if proﬁts are positive and there
is no diversion, the old manager pays out a fraction c of the proﬁts as dividends to himself and
passes on the rest, wt+1, to his successor.
Bailout guarantees. A ﬁrm is in default if it is either insolvent or the manager diverts the
gross returns. Lenders are given a “systemic” bailout guarantee: if a critical mass of ﬁrms (for
concreteness, 50%) is in default, the government steps in and ensures that lenders walk away with
what they were owed. The guarantee covers both T- and N-debt. In addition to paying lenders,
the government recapitalizes ﬁrms in default by giving a small endowment e of T-goods to the
new managers. In other words, for insolvent ﬁrms, wt+1 = e. The total cost of a bailout is thus
ft+1 = (1 + ρt)bt + pt+1(1 + ρn
t )bn
t + e. It is ﬁnanced by a lump sum tax on consumers.
3.3. Consumers
The representative consumer derives utility from tradable (cT
t ) and nontradable goods (cN
t ):
E
XT
t=0 βt[cT
t + dt · log(cN
t )],
where (dt)T
t=0 is a deterministic sequence. Every period, the consumer receives an endowment of
yt = y0λt(λ > 1) units of the tradable good. In light of (3.1) and complete markets, her budget
constraint is
E
XT
t=0 βt[cT
t + ptcN
t + ft − yt] ≤ 0.
If y0 is large enough, which we assume is the case, the consumer’s demand for N-goods is
Dt(pt) =
dt
pt
.
3.4. Equilibrium
Every period, investment and ﬁnancing decisions are determined by managers’ interaction
with ﬁnancial markets. Since the occurrence of a bailout depends on how many ﬁrms default,
managers’decisionsareinterdependent.Formally,wedeﬁnea“creditmarketgame”thatcaptures
competitive bond pricing with a large number of risk neutral lenders, while allowing for strategic
interaction of bond issuers.
6. The parameter h can be interpreted as a measure of the severity of the enforceability problem, with a low h
representing lax contract enforcement. If h ≥ 1 + r, diversion is always more expensive than repayment of debt and the
diversion cost has no effect.SCHNEIDER & TORNELL 7
The credit market game. The order of moves is as follows. At the beginning of period t,
each new manager is assigned two risk-neutral lenders, one of whom invests in T-bonds only,
while the other invests in N-bonds only. Given internal funds wt, all managers simultaneously
announce a plan that satisﬁes budget constraint (3.2). All lenders then simultaneously decide
whetherornottofundtheplanproposedtothem(i.e.topurchasethebonds)ornot.Subsequently,
those managers whose plans have been funded decide whether or not to incur the diversion cost.7
Payoffs are determined during the following period. If the ﬁrm is solvent, the manager
receives the proﬁt πt+1(pt+1) if he has not set up a diversion scheme, or the gross returns minus
the diversion cost, Gt+1 − h(wt + bt + bn
t ), otherwise. If the ﬁrm is insolvent, the manager’s
payoff is zero if he has not set up a diversion scheme, or −h(wt + bt + bn
t ) otherwise. T-lenders
(N-lenders) receive payoffs (ρt − r)bt((pt+1ρn
t − r)bn
t ) if either the ﬁrm they lend to is solvent
or that ﬁrm is in default together with more than 50% of all ﬁrms, and bailout guarantees are in
place. In all other cases, T-lenders (N-lenders) receive payoffs of −(1 + r)bt(−(1 + r)bn
t ).
Equilibrium concept. The following deﬁnition integrates the credit market game with the
rest of the economy. To start off the economy, we assume that in period 0 there is both a cohort
of initial incumbent managers who have an amount q0 of nontradables to sell and a cohort of new
managers who have an endowment e0 of tradables.
Deﬁnition. A symmetric equilibrium is a collection of stochastic processes {It,st,sn
t ,bt,
bn
t ,ρ,ρn
t , pt,wt} such that:
1. Given internal funds wt, current prices pt and the distribution of next period’s prices, the
plan {It,st,sn
t ,bt,bn
t ,ρ,ρn
t } is part of a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium of the
credit market game.
2. The market for nontradables clears:
dt
pt
+ It = θIt−1.
3. Internal funds evolve according to
wt+1 =
n(1 − c)π(pt) if π(pt) > 0
e otherwise.
3.5. Discussion of the assumptions
We now relate the setup of our model to the institutional environment we want to capture.
A. The credit market. Three main results of the credit market analysis in Section 4
are crucial for the macroeconomic dynamics in Section 6: (i) ﬁrms face binding borrowing
constraints that make investment depend on cash ﬂow, (ii) bailout guarantees increase the
multiplier linking investment to cash ﬂow and (iii) bailout guarantees encourage ﬁrms to
denominate debt in T-goods. Result (i) arises in many models in which insiders offer contracts to
lenders that do not share their objectives. However, the result is not obvious when contracts
are guaranteed. Lenders need not care about insiders’ objectives as long as the government
commits to pay them off. This weakens the mechanisms that give rise to borrowing constraints
in common contracting models. More generally, any model of guaranteed contracts must explain
why insiders cannot run “scams” that exploit the guarantee at an arbitrary scale by promising
7. For completeness, if a plan is not funded, managers and lenders receive a payoff of zero. This is not restrictive,
since plans can involve no borrowing.8 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
huge interest rates. Here, we provide a concrete setup that is in line with the institutional
environment of middle income countries and in which the above issues can be made explicit.
Diversion. The diversion technology provides a basic conﬂict of interest between insiders
(managers) and lenders. Diversion may be thought of as a transfer of the ﬁrm’s assets to another
company indirectly owned by the manager. It is reasonable that such transfers are easier when
the ﬁrm is solvent—creditors typically monitor managers of bankrupt ﬁrms much more closely.
Our assumption that diversion from insolvent ﬁrms is impossible thus captures increased creditor
scrutiny in a stark way.
The essential feature of the diversion technology is that the cost of diversion is proportional
to total assets, while the beneﬁt increases with the debt burden. A ﬁrm can thus commit to
repay as long as the debt burden is not too large relative to the size of the ﬁrm. This gives rise
to a borrowing constraint and a multiplier linking investment to cash ﬂow (result (i) above).
The effective debt burden to the ﬁrm, and hence the beneﬁt of diversion, is lower when a
bailout occurs—this leads to result (ii). The timing of the diversion decision (that is, it is taken
before uncertainty is resolved) is convenient because it implies that the investment multiplier is
independent of future prices. Finally, the restriction to standard debt and the fact that managers
cannot steal from insolvent ﬁrms are both important in ruling out scams. This is explained further
below.
Standard debt. Standard debt is the typical instrument accessible to ﬁrms in middle
income countries. In addition, bailout guarantees are usually deﬁned over gross debt positions,
ratherthan,say,thenetﬁnancialassetpositionsoftheﬁrm.Byimposingstandard,noncontingent,
debt, we can naturally explore the former type of guarantees. We also emphasize that, in our
two-state environment, a restriction to standard debt does not limit ﬁrms’ ability to hedge real
exchange rate risk: issuing N-debt provides a perfect hedge. Allowing for derivatives would
not improve hedging, it would only facilitate risk taking. Given our interest in equilibria that
exhibit crises, the assumption thus appears conservative; it ensures that our model also applies to
countries with less developed derivatives markets.
Systemic guarantees. The assumption seems realistic: a bailout does not occur if just any
individual ﬁrm is insolvent, especially not if the ﬁrm is small. Instead, bailouts occur when there
is a critical mass of insolvencies.8 The role of guarantees in the model is to induce managers
to take on insolvency risk (result (iii) above). The systemic nature is crucial: if any insolvency
resulted in a bailout, diversion would be costless and ﬁrms would not face borrowing constraints.
Systemic guarantees also help explain why risk taking is coordinated through debt denomination.
Simply investing in projects subject to large idiosyncratic risk is not a proﬁtable way to exploit
these guarantees.
Bankruptcy costs. As usual, bankruptcy costs capture deadweight costs of the bankruptcy
process.Inouranalysis,theymatteronlywhenabailoutisnotexpected.Inthatcase,theyprovide
a reason for managers to actively avoid insolvency, as in Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993). This
means that managers strictly prefer to hedge real exchange rate risk, by denominating debt in N-
goods. In contrast, if a bailout is expected, bankruptcy costs are borne by the government and
their size is irrelevant for contracting between managers and lenders.
8. For example, consider the Mexican experience. In the aftermath of the 1994 crisis, the entire ﬁnancial system
became insolvent. In order to ensure that all debt obligations were met, the U.S. Treasury and international organizations
provided a generous bailout. In 1999, however, a big Mexican ﬁrm, GAN, announced the suspension of the service of its
debt (which stood at more than one billion U.S. dollars). The Mexican government did not provide a bailout.SCHNEIDER & TORNELL 9
No scams. In our model, the nature of debt contracts, the diversion technology, and the
guarantees all combine to rule out scams in which managers promise huge interest rates and
have their plans ﬁnanced by a bailout. To clarify the role of the various assumptions, it is helpful
to informally preview the argument of Section 4.1. Suppose a bailout occurs in only one of the
two states. A lender will then only fund a plan that entails diversion if the interest rate in the
bailout state is large enough to compensate the loss in the other state. With standard debt, this
will drive the ﬁrm into insolvency in both states, if the bailout state is unlikely enough. Since the
manager cannot steal from an insolvent ﬁrm, diversion becomes unproﬁtable. The restriction to
standard debt is important here: guaranteed contingent claims would allow managers to shift all
payments to the taxpayer by issuing claims that pay out only in the bailout state.
Extreme parameter values. Throughout the paper we make stark assumptions on the
parameters of the contracting problem. For example, we have assumed that managers can divert
all gross assets, that all assets are dissipated in bankruptcy and that no diversion whatsoever can
take place in insolvency. These assumptions are not essential for the qualitative effects stressed
in the analysis of the credit market game. However, they greatly simplify our dynamic analysis
in Section 6 below, since they guarantee that the investment multipliers are independent of future
equilibrium prices.
B. Other elements of the economy.
The tradables sector. We have represented the tradables sector by a deterministic
endowment. This may be viewed as a reduced form of the following more elaborate setup.
Suppose that there are competitive, ﬁnancially unconstrained, ﬁrms that produce T-goods from
labour (lt) and T-goods (kt) with a constant returns technology
qT
t = gtl1−ε
t kε
t gt = g0(1 + g)t,ε ∈ [0,1),
where g is the rate of technological progress. In addition, suppose that the consumer is endowed
with one unit of labour, supplied inelastically and that there is full depreciation. Since the rental
rate of capital is the gross world interest rate 1 + r, equilibrium T-production and consumer’s
income are, respectively
qT
t = g
1
1−ε
t

ε
1 + r
 ε
1−ε
, yt = [1 − ε]qT
t .
The endowment yt in the consumer’s budget constraint may thus be viewed as wage income.
Sectoral asymmetries. The assumption that T-sector ﬁrms have access to perfect capital
markets, whereas the N-sector faces credit market imperfections is motivated by two institutional
features of middle income countries. First, bank credit is the major source of external ﬁnance
for N-sector ﬁrms. In contrast, many T-sector ﬁrms have access to international capital markets
because they can pledge export receivables as collateral to foreign lenders. Banks in turn are
strongly exposed to the N-sector and do not hedge real exchange rate risk.9 Second, systemic
bailout guarantees apply to bank debt.
The assumption that the N-sector uses its own product as an input is important to allow
the N-to-T output ratio to grow during booms and also to generate crises associated with a
self-fulﬁlling collapse in demand for N goods. The constant-returns, single-input technology
simpliﬁes the analysis considerably since the contracting problem becomes linear.
9. Even when banks denominate loans in foreign currency, they face the risk that domestic ﬁrms will not be able
to repay in the event of a real depreciation.10 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
Consumers. The role of consumers is to provide a demand for N-goods. What is key for
our argument is that this demand for N-goods (i) is downward-sloping, and (ii) is expected to
shift outward at some point in the future. Requirement (i) is necessary for multiple prices to
exist, while (ii) sets the stage for the expansion of the N-sector. In our dynamic analysis below,
we will assume that the consumer’s demand curve dt/pt shifts out at time T.10
Our model permits perfect intertemporal consumption smoothing and hence does not
emphasizetheroleofconsumptionﬂuctuationsinexplainingboom-bustcycles.Instead,wefocus
on investment. This is in line with the stylized fact that consumption ﬂuctuates much less than
investment over the boom-bust cycle.
Managers. We have assumed that N-sector ﬁrms are run by overlapping generations of
managerswithshorthorizons.Thisassumptionmakesthemodeltractable,sincethecreditmarket
gamecanbesolvedperiodbyperiod.Atthesametime,along-livedmanagerwouldtypicallyﬁnd
insolvency more costly if he stood to lose a “franchise value” arising from the future operation
of the ﬁrm. This would provide another reason to actively avoid insolvency and could make him
less willing to take on risk than in our setting. However, the qualitative tradeoffs should remain
the same in a more complicated model with long-lived managers.11
3.6. Road map
We characterize equilibria in two steps. In Section 4 we examine the credit market game for given
prices. We show that (i) in a world without guarantees N-sector managers hedge insolvency
risk by ﬁnancing their ﬁrms with N-debt, and (ii) if there are guarantees and “enough” real
exchange rate risk, it is optimal for all N-sector managers to coordinate on T-debt ﬁnancing. This
latter case generates a fragile capital structure for which a real depreciation induces widespread
insolvencies in the N-sector. We also show that in either case binding borrowing constraints arise
in equilibrium.
In Section 5 we characterize the mechanism behind self-fulﬁlling crises. Taking as given the
capital structure and expected future prices, we show that if N-sector ﬁrms hold enough T-debt
and there is a strong balance sheet effect, there are two market clearing prices. The high price
leaves ﬁrms solvent, while the low price bankrupts them and triggers a bailout.
In Section 6 we characterize equilibrium dynamics. In Section 6.1 we show that a world
without guarantees gives rise to “safe lending booms,” ﬁnanced by N-debt, in which real
appreciation coexists with an increase in both the credit-to-GDP and the N-to-T ratio. Then, in
Section 6.2, we establish the existence of sunspot equilibria which feature similar (but stronger)
lending booms, ﬁnanced by T-debt. These booms may be punctuated by self-fulﬁlling crises or
may end in a soft landing. Finally, in Section 7 we relate the time series generated by the model
to the stylized facts.
10. Although “good news” about the future value of N-goods is a crucial element to produce a boom, it is not
essential for creating fragility at a point in time. In particular, the “crisis mechanism” that arises from the interaction of
the two distortions could be activated in any environment where the N-sector starts with a sufﬁciently large debt burden.
For instance, this debt burden could be inherited from a formerly state-owned banking system.
11. See Schneider (1999) for a model of banking with long-lived managers and deposit insurance in which the
franchise value plays a key role.SCHNEIDER & TORNELL 11
4. FINANCIAL STRUCTURE
Inthissection,wetakepricesasgivenandderiveequilibriaofthecreditmarketgame.Weassume
throughout that there is “enough” real exchange rate variability:12
¯ pt+1θ
pt
> 1 + r > h >
p
t+1θ
pt
. (4.1)
4.1. Investment and ﬁnancing without guarantees
For an economy without bailout guarantees, we establish existence of a safe credit market
equilibrium. Firms hedge insolvency risk to avoid bankruptcy costs and face binding borrowing
constraints. As a result, investment is proportional to internal funds.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose there are no bailout guarantees. If the probability of the good
state α is close to or equal to one, there exists a symmetric SPE of the credit market game such
that (i) ﬁrms never become insolvent, (ii) managers do not divert, (iii) all debt is N-debt (bt = 0)
with 1+ρn
t = 1+r
pe
t+1
, (iv) ﬁrms do not purchase default-free bonds (st = sn
t = 0), and (v) physical
investment expenditure is proportional to internal funds:
ptIt =
wt
1 − βh
= mswt. (4.2)
A formal proof is provided in the Appendix; here we sketch the intuition. In the absence
of guarantees, no manager will propose a plan that entails diversion: lenders would reject it
since they could not break even.13 It follows that, under any proposed plan, the cost of diverting
all assets must be larger than the manager’s beneﬁt of diversion, which equals expected debt
payments. Regardless of what type of debt is issued, managers have no incentive to pay lenders
more than their opportunity cost 1 + r. The no-diversion condition is thus
h(wt + bt + bn
t ) ≥ (1 + r)(bt + bn
t ). (4.3)
Since h < 1 + r, this inequality is an endogenous borrowing constraint. Importantly, the debt
capacity of the ﬁrm does not depend on the denomination of debt.
If α is large enough, condition (4.1) implies that physical investment has a positive NPV. It
is thus optimal to invest as much as the borrowing constraint allows and to not hold any default-
free bonds. The bound on investment then follows by substituting for debt from the budget
constraint (3.2):
hptIt ≥ (1 + r)(ptIt − wt). (4.4)
Since the maximal investment level is the same whether or not the ﬁrm always remains
solvent, the optimal choice of solvency depends on the expected proﬁt per unit of investment. The
lender always breaks even in expected value. Therefore, the manager of a solvent ﬁrm captures
the whole NPV of investment, while the manager of a ﬁrm that is insolvent, say, in the bad state,
must bear bankruptcy costs. His payoff is then only
E(πt+1) = {pe
t+1θIt − (1 + r)(ptIt − wt)} − (1 − α)p
t+1θIt (4.5)
= {NPV of the project} − {expected bankruptcy cost}.
12. The equilibrium price process derived in Section 6 will satisfy this condition.
13. At the time lenders decide whether to buy bonds, the manager’s diversion decision is perfectly foreseen. In
addition, without guarantees, there is no interdependence among ﬁrms.12 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
Bankruptcy costs thus provide an incentive to hedge against a real depreciation and to
remain solvent in both states. A perfect hedge is to denominate all debt in N-goods. Indeed,
managers want their ﬁrms to remain solvent in both states:
π( ¯ pt+1) = ¯ pt+1θIt − (1 + r)bt − (1 + rn
t ) ¯ pt+1bn
t ≥ 0,
π(p
t+1) = p
t+1θIt − (1 + r)bt − (1 + rn
t )p
t+1bn
t ≥ 0.
Since investment has positive NPV and interest rate parity holds, we have θ > 1 + rn
t . Holding
ﬁxed total debt payments (1 +r)(bt + bn
t ), the solvency constraints can be made nonbinding by
setting bt = 0. It is thus always (at least, weakly) better to ﬁnance a safe plan with N-debt.
4.2. Investment and ﬁnancing with guarantees
For an economy with guarantees, the safe credit market equilibrium discussed above continues
to be an equilibrium. If everybody else chooses to hedge, there is no bailout. Thus, contracting
between any individual manager and his creditors works exactly as before. However, we now
establish existence of a second risky credit market equilibrium, in which ﬁrms ﬁnance investment
with T-debt and become insolvent in the bad state.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose bailout guarantees are present. If α is close to (but less than)
one, there exists a symmetric SPE of the credit market game such that the equilibrium plan
(It,st,sn
t ,bt,bn
t ,ρt,ρn
t ) satisﬁes: (i) ﬁrms become insolvent in the bad state; (ii) managers do
not divert; (iii) all debt is T-debt (bn
t = 0) with 1 + ρt = 1 + r; (iv) ﬁrms do not purchase
default-free bonds (st = sn
t = 0); and (v) physical investment expenditure is proportional to
internal funds
ptIt =
wt
1 − α−1βh
= mrwt, (4.6)
where the multiplier mr is strictly larger than the multiplier in the absence of guarantees.
In the Appendix, we prove that, given other managers’ strategies, it is optimal for any
individual manager to select a plan satisfying (i)–(v). The argument parallels that of the safe case.
First, it is established that an endogenous borrowing constraint arises. This is no longer obvious,
becausemanagersmightpromisehugepaymentsandthendiverttheﬁrm’sassets.Lendersshould
be happy to fund such diversion schemes at any scale as long as they are bailed out. Three
assumptions are critical to rule out such scams: (a) bailout guarantees are systemic, (b) debt is
noncontingent, and (c) a manager cannot divert if his ﬁrm is insolvent.
Suppose all other managers default only in the bad state. By (a), a bailout only occurs in
the bad state. Thus, under any diversion scheme proposed by an individual manager, lenders will
receive nothing in the good state. To induce them to fund the diversion scheme, the manager
must promise very high interest rates: the bailout, which occurs only in the highly unlikely crisis
state, must compensate lenders for the loss to be incurred in the good state. However, if interest
rates are too high, then, by (b), the ﬁrm becomes insolvent in both states. By (c), diversion in the
good state becomes impossible, and the diversion scheme is not proﬁtable.
Any proposed plan must therefore imply diversion costs that exceed expected debt
payments. This gives rise to a borrowing constraint, as in the case without guarantees. What
is new is that guarantees lower expected debt payments and thereby raise the borrowing limit.
Indeed, lenders are happy to fund a no-diversion plan at the riskless rate r. A ﬁrm that issues T-
debt and defaults in the bad state thus expects to repay only α(1+r)bt. The borrowing constraintSCHNEIDER & TORNELL 13
becomes
hptIt ≥ α(1 + r)b = α(1 + r)(ptIt − wt). (4.7)
This implies an investment limit mrwt that is strictly greater than the limit faced by a ﬁrm that
always remains solvent. The latter expects to repay (1 + r)(bt + bn
t ) and hence faces the same
investment limit as a ﬁrm in a world with no guarantees: mswt.
The guarantee not only raises debt capacity, it also increases the per unit beneﬁt for a ﬁrm
that defaults in the bad state. For such a ﬁrm, we now have
Et(πt+1) = {pe
t+1θIt − (1 + r)(ptIt − wt)} − (1 − α)p
t+1θIt + (1 − α)(1 + r)(ptIt − wt).
Here, the third term is the subsidy implicit in the guarantee. The manager trades off the gains
from a risky plan against the bankruptcy costs. We show in the appendix that for α close to 1,
defaulting in the bad state is preferred to always remaining solvent.
Finally, consider optimal debt denomination. The manager desires insolvency in the bad
state only, that is, π( ¯ pt+1) ≥ 0 > π(p
t+1). For a given amount of borrowing, bt + bn
t , this
is easier to achieve by increasing the share of T-debt because uncovered interest parity implies
(1 + rn
t )p
t+1 < 1 + r < (1 + rn
t ) ¯ pt+1. At the same time, expected proﬁts increase the more of
the ﬁrm’s borrowing is done with T-debt. It is therefore optimal to set bn
t = 0.
5. SELF-FULFILLING CRISES
We now provide intuition for the crisis mechanism in a typical period t < T. In particular, we
show that given future prices and the outcome of the credit market game in period t − 1, there
can be multiple market clearing prices in period t. This is important for the existence of sunspot
equilibria in the next section. Suppose that some credit market equilibrium was played in period
t − 1. Incumbent managers enter the current period with a supply of nontradables qt, no bond
holdings and debt burden
(1 + ρt)bt + pt(1 + ρn
t )bn
t =: Lt + ptLn
t .
The new cohort of managers takes as given future prices as well as internal funds inherited from
incumbents. If ﬁrms are solvent, new managers start out with internal funds
wt = (1 − c)(ptqt − Lt − ptLn
t ). (5.1)
In contrast, if the bad state is realized and ﬁrms become insolvent, wt = e. Investment is
determined in an equilibrium of the credit market game, i.e. ptIt = mtwt, where mt can be
ms or mr, depending on whether the equilibrium is safe or risky. The real exchange rate adjusts
to equalize the supply and demand of nontradables:
qt =



dt
pt + ηt
h
qt − Ln
t − Lt
pt
i
if ptqt > Lt + ptLn
t
dt+mte
pt otherwise,
(5.2)
where ηt = (1 − c)mt is the cash ﬂow multiplier of the N-sector.
Suppose the credit market equilibrium played in period t −1 was safe. Incumbent managers
then have only N-debt (Lt = 0). As a result, demand slopes downward and there is a unique
equilibrium price. In contrast, suppose a risky equilibrium was played and managers have only
T-debt (Ln
t = 0). In this case, price movements affect revenues, but leave the debt burden
unchanged. Demand can become backward bending, as in Figure 2, and there can be multiple
equilibria.
Indeed, for prices below the cutoff price pc
t = Lt/qt, all N-ﬁrms are insolvent. Total
demand in this range is driven by consumers and is thus downward-sloping. In contrast, for14 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
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prices above pc
t , an increase in the price is accompanied by an increase in cash ﬂow. Since there
are binding borrowing constraints at the ﬁrm level, aggregate investment demand is increasing in
the price of N-goods. The next proposition states that multiple equilibria exist if and only if there
is enough T-debt and there is a “strong” balance sheet effect: ηt > 1.
Proposition 5.1 (Self-fulﬁlling Crises). Multiple market clearing prices (that is,
solutions to (5.2)) exist if and only if
(i) the level of T-debt in the N-sector is high enough: Lt > d + mte,
(ii) the cash ﬂow multiplier ηt is larger than one.
The ﬁrst condition says that the N-sector cannot be too small. For a small debt burden Lt,
aggregate demand mainly consists of downward sloping consumer demand. The consumer
thus “stabilizes” the price. As Lt grows, N-sector expenditure on N-goods rises relative to
consumption expenditure. The second condition requires that the balance sheet effect is strong
enough, so that a change in the price of N-goods induces a more than proportional change in
the N-sector’s expenditure on its own goods. This occurs when ηt > 1 because investment
expenditure equals ηt(ptqt − Lt). A high ηt requires a low dividend payout rate c and low
enforceability problems (large h, permitting high leverage).14
With identical fundamentals, in terms of supply and debt, the market may clear in one of
two equilibria. In a “solvent” equilibrium (point B in Figure 2), the price is high, inﬂating away
enough of N-ﬁrms’ debt (measured in nontradables) to allow them to bid away a large share
of output from the T-sector. In contrast, in the “crisis” equilibrium (point A), the price is low
to allow the T-sector and bankrupt N-ﬁrms with little internal funds to absorb the supply of N-
goods. Which of these two points is reached depends on expectations. This does not mean that
fundamentals are irrelevant. They determine whether the environment is fragile enough to allow
two equilibria.
14. Proposition 5.1 does not depend on the fact that the aid payment e is a constant. For example, it also holds if
aid is a fraction of output, et = ωptqt.SCHNEIDER & TORNELL 15
6. EQUILIBRIUM DYNAMICS
In this section, we characterize the dynamics of the economy. We begin with an environment
with enforceability problems, but no bailout guarantees. We show that if the future looks brighter
than the present and if there are strong balance sheet effects, there can be “safe lending boom”
equilibria, characterized by increasing credit-to-GDP and N-to-T output ratios, and by real
appreciation. We then introduce bailout guarantees and characterize a “risky lending boom
equilibrium” where the N-sector grows faster, but the economy is vulnerable to self-fulﬁlling
crises. Both types of equilibria are consistent with the stylized fact that many of lending booms
do not end in crisis, but in a soft landing.
Lending booms typically take place at times when the local economy is expected to expand,
which will increase the demand for local (nontradable) goods, such as construction and services.
High expectations might come about because of a reform (such as a liberalization of trade) or
discovery of a natural resource (oil). In our model, we capture this “fundamental” reason for a
lending boom by an anticipated outward shift in the demand for N-goods by consumers. The
anticipated shift is represented by the preference parameter dt, which satisﬁes
dt =

d if t < T
ˆ d ≥ d if t = T.
(6.1)
6.1. Safe lending boom equilibria
In our model, the only source of uncertainty is a sunspot. Multiple market clearing prices, which
are crucial for a sunspot to matter, exist only if there is a large amount of T-debt. Since managers
will choose a risky debt structure only if there are bailout guarantees, it follows that in their
absence there cannot be an equilibrium in which prices depend on the sunspot. Instead, in
economies without guarantees, safe credit market equilibria obtain every period and ﬁrms are
always solvent.
We now characterize a safe equilibrium. Market clearing for nontradables requires that
consumption and investment expenditures sum to the value of output: dt + mswt = ptqt. From
Proposition 4.1, we have that internal funds evolve according to wt = [1 − c][ptqt − ptLn
t ] =
[1 − c][ptqt − hmswt−1]. Since output is proportional to internal funds in the previous period:
qt = θIt−1 =
θmswt−1
pt−1 , it follows that any equilibrium path of output and internal funds (qt,wt)
must be a solution to
qt = θ
mswt−1
mswt−1 + d
qt−1, t ≤ T (6.2)
1 − ηs
1 − c
wt = d − hmswt−1, t < T (6.3)
wT = ˆ d − hmswT−1, (6.4)
with initial conditions q0 and w0 = e0, and where ηs = (1 − c)ms is the “safe” cash ﬂow
multiplier. A solution to (6.2)–(6.4) is an equilibrium if the implied price path given by
pt =
( d+mswt
qt t < T
ˆ d
qT t = T
(6.5)
is steep enough to make the technology a non-negative NPV undertaking (that is, θpt+1/pt ≥
1 + r for all t < T).
Equation (6.2) states that the fraction of nontradables production that is invested depends
on the ﬁnancial strength of the N-sector. If internal funds are low, N-ﬁrms can borrow very little.16 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
Holding supply ﬁxed, weak investment demand implies that the price is low and that consumers
absorb a larger fraction of the available supply. On the other hand, a strong N-sector (high wt−1)
can expand and will be able to bid more resources away from consumers at time t.
Equation (6.3) provides a “ﬂow of funds” account for the “consolidated” N-sector, putting
both cohorts of managers together. The R.H.S. is “consolidated cash ﬂow”: sales to the household
sector minus repayment of debt to foreigners. The L.H.S. includes the “net new funds raised:”
new debt issued (bt + bn
t = wt(ms − 1)) minus dividends paid out (cπt = c
1−cwt).
We are interested in lending boom equilibria in which the real exchange rate appreciates,
and N-output (qt) as well as the credit-to-GDP ratio ((b + bn)/(ptqt + yt)) and the N-to-T
ratio (ptqt/yt) increase over time. The existence of such equilibria is established in the next
proposition. The proposition makes clear that lending booms need not only reﬂect excessive risk-
taking and corruption, and that they need not end in crashes. Lending booms can be episodes
during which credit constrained sectors grow faster because the future looks brighter than the
present. Furthermore, they can end in a soft landing.
Proposition 6.1 (Safe Lending Booms). Suppose that there is a strong balance sheet
effect (ηs > 1).
1. If the N-sector’s initial funds satisfy e0 > e and the future shift in T-sector’s demand for
N-goods is large enough ˆ d > d(e0), there exists a safe symmetric equilibrium in which the
N-sector’s internal funds increase over time.
2. For a large enough terminal time T there is a τ < T − 1, such that if, in addition:
(i) θ ∈
 
1,
ηsh
ηs−1

, then the real exchange rate appreciates and the output of N-goods
increases from τ to T − 1;
(ii) λ <
ηsh
ηs−1, then the credit-to-GDP and N-to-T ratios increase from τ to T − 1.
Three conditions must be met to ensure growth of the N-sector over time. First, there must
be a strong balance sheet effect (ηs > 1). If instead ηs < 1, the N-sector could not expand
over time, and could not run a deﬁcit in anticipation of strong demand in the future.15 Second,
the accumulated debt must be repaid in the ﬁnal period. Thus, the preference shift ˆ d − d must
be sufﬁciently large. Third, for the return on investment Rt+1 = pt+1θ/pt to be high enough
in periods t < T − 1, investment demand must grow fast enough in relation to the supply of
N-goods. Since supply at time t is proportional to internal funds available at t −1 and demand is
proportional to internal funds available at t, it follows that internal funds must grow fast enough.
It is apparent from (6.3) that if wt is increasing over time, it will do so at an increasing rate.
Thus, if w0 is above a certain threshold, investment will always have a positive NPV provided
that the demand shift at T is sufﬁciently large.
In order to match the observation that increasing N-output coincides with a real
appreciation, we need to determine how the rise in the value of N-output (ptqt) translates into
changes in prices and quantities. If the technology parameter θ were very high, supply would
outpace demand. As a result the price would fall over time, while investment would rise. At the
other extreme, if θ were small, we could have an equilibrium along which nontradables become
increasingly scarce, with ﬁrms chasing the returns offered by rising prices, but being able to
15. If ηs < 1, the size of the N-sector measured, for example, by the value of assets converges to a steady state
value (note that (6.3) may be rewritten as wt = ηsh
ηs−1wt−1− (1−c)d
ηs−1 , for t < T). In this type of equilibrium, the N-sector
makes a proﬁt every period and ﬁrms’ behaviour is independent of the demand shift occurring at date T. It would be the
natural case to consider if we were interested in long run issues.SCHNEIDER & TORNELL 17
afford less and less investment. Thus, to match the stylized facts, θ must take the intermediate
values speciﬁed in Proposition 6.1.
Finally, the model matches the stylized fact that along a lending boom there is an increase
in both the credit-to-GDP and the N-to-T ratios ((b + bn)/(ptqt + yλt) and ptqt/yλt). The
N-sector’s internal funds not only grow, but do so at an increasing rate (which converges to
ηsh
ηs−1−1). Thus, the credit constrained N-sector can eventually grow faster than the unconstrained
T-sector if the horizon is long enough and T-sector growth is not too high
 
λ <
ηsh
ηs−1

.
6.2. Sunspot equilibria (SE)
Proposition 6.1 has established that systemic guarantees are not necessary to generate lending
booms. We now show that when guarantees are present, economies which would otherwise
exhibit safe lending booms can now exhibit risky lending booms which allow faster growth
(ﬁnanced by cheap T-debt), but which may end in self-fulﬁlling crises. We begin with a
preliminary question: is there a possibility of unanticipated self-fulﬁlling crises along a safe
lending boom equilibrium? We then establish the existence of sunspot equilibria. These
equilibria exhibit three phases. Initially, the economy travels along a safe path. Then, when the N-
sector becomes large enough there is a switch to a fragile phase in which the risky credit market
equilibria of Section 4 are played every period. If the boom lasts long enough, the economy must
switch back to a safe path before terminal time (that is, there is a soft landing).
Safe equilibria and unanticipated crises. The safe lending boom equilibria continue
to be equilibria in an economy with bailout guarantees. Suppose every manager is convinced
that the safe equilibrium price will be realized in the next period. No bailouts will be granted.
Therefore, all managers will simply play the best safe plan and the price evolves exactly as in a
safe equilibrium.
To think about unanticipated crises, we use the fact that managers are indifferent between T
and N-debt if prices are deterministic.16 Suppose that all debt is actually denominated in
tradables. Unanticipated crises can now occur during a sufﬁciently long safe lending boom. We
know from Proposition 5.1 that multiple market clearing prices exist provided the amount of
T-debt to be repaid in period t is large enough (Lt ≥ d + mse):
hmswt−1 > d + mse. (6.6)
We call a state (qt,wt−1) fragile if (6.6) holds. If the economy is in a fragile state, then the
outstanding stock of T-debt is so large that it cannot be repaid by selling output to the T-sector
and new managers with internal funds e. It follows that there is a market clearing price at which
all ﬁrms default.
Fragility need not be present at all times along a safe lending boom equilibrium. In
particular, if it is difﬁcult to enforce contracts (low h), and e0 is low, the initial phase of a boom
need not be fragile. However, by Proposition 6.1, the debt burden hmswt−1 is increasing over
time. The economy must thus enter into a “fragile region” if the boom continues long enough.
Anticipated crises. We now ask whether crises can actually occur with positive
probability along the equilibrium path. We know from Section 4 that under exchange rate risk
and bailout guarantees, managers may create credit risk from real exchange rate risk by ﬁnancing
investment with T-debt. This requires that there is “sufﬁcient real exchange rate risk” in the sense
16. See Lemma A2 in the Appendix for a formal argument.18 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
of condition (4.1). In particular, ﬁrms must expect (i) a sufﬁciently high return on investment in
the absence of a depreciation, and (ii) a sufﬁciently low return after a depreciation, so that it
is possible to claim the bailout subsidy by defaulting. In addition, the probability of a crisis
must be sufﬁciently low to ensure that the ex ante expected return is high enough and borrowing
constraints arise in equilibrium.17 Section 4 has also shown that if there is enough T debt, there
are two market clearing prices, the lower of which bankrupts ﬁrms, and hence triggers a bailout.
The next proposition shows that these two effects can be elements of one consistent story.
Proposition 6.2 (Sunspot Equilibria). Suppose bailout guarantees are in place and
there is a strong balance sheet effect (ηr > 1). There exists a region
S = {(e0,α,T,d) : e0 > e,α > α(e0),T > T(e0,α), ˆ d > d(e0,α,T)}
for the N-sector’s initial funds, the probability of the bad sunspot state, the terminal time, and the
consumer’s demand shift, such that for all economies with (e0,α,T, ˆ d) ∈ S, there is a sunspot
equilibrium with the following properties:
1. There is a “fragile phase” [τ,τ], with τ ≤ T − 1, during which a risky credit market
equilibrium is played as long as the good sunspot state is realized.
2. For any period during the fragile phase (t ∈ [τ,τ]), a crisis in which all N-sector ﬁrms
default occurs the following period if the bad sunspot state is realized.
3. A safe credit market equilibrium is played outside the fragile phase and after a crisis has
occurred.
4. There is a τ ∈ [τ,T) such that, along the “lucky path” on which no crisis occurs, (i)
the real exchange rate appreciates between τ and T − 1, and the output of nontradables
increases from τ on, if θ ∈
 
1,
ηrhα−1
ηr−1

, and (ii) both the credit-to-GDP and the N-to-T
ratios increase from τ to T − 1, if λ <
ηrhα−1
ηr−1 .
5. If a crisis occurs at t, (i) investment and credit are lower in t than in t − 1, (ii) there is
a real depreciation from t − 1 to t, and (iii) if e < d
(θ−1)ms , N-output falls between t and
t + 1.
This proposition states that if initial internal funds (e0) are small, the ﬁrst phase of a SE
must be safe because the debt burden is too small and crises cannot occur. Thus, managers adopt
safe plans. Since wealth and the debt burden follow increasing paths along this safe phase, there
is a time, say τ −1, at which a fragile state is reached (i.e. (6.6) holds at (qτ−1,wτ−1)). Starting
at time τ − 1 there can be a switch to a risky phase provided agents believe that there will be a
crisis with probability 1 − α during the next period. Of course, this risky phase cannot last until
terminal time because the economy cannot be in a fragile state at T − 1: there cannot be a crisis
in the ﬁnal period because ﬁrms do not reinvest at T. Thus, there must be a switch to a third safe
phase no later than T − 1.
In order to characterize the risky phase consider a typical period t − 1. Suppose agents
believe that there will be a crisis with probability 1 − α in period t, and that this risk induces
them to issue T-debt. Firms are solvent in the good state in period t. Thus, internal funds evolve
according to
wt = (1 − c)(ptqt − Lt) = (1 − c)(ptqt − α−1hmrwt−1). (6.7)
17. Recall that Proposition 4.2 required that α is close enough to one.SCHNEIDER & TORNELL 19
Still conditioning on the good state being realized, the market clearing and output equations are:
d + mrwt = ptqt, qt =
θmrwt−1
pt−1
. (6.8)
The solution to (6.7)–(6.8) determines the “lucky path,” along which no crisis occurs. This path
is part of an SE provided that two conditions are satisﬁed. First, the expected price path is steep
enough to ensure that investment in N-goods has a non-negative NPV (θpe
t+1 ≥ (1 + r)pt).
Second, the “crisis return” must be sufﬁciently low: if the bad state were to be realized, the price
would be low enough to bankrupt ﬁrms (π(p
t) < 0).
If the initial level of internal funds is high enough, wt will increase along the lucky path
provided there is a strong balance sheet effect. Moreover, if crises are rare events, the expected
return will be high enough to make investment proﬁtable. Since during a crisis internal funds of
the new cohort are wt = e, the second condition is satisﬁed provided that p
tqt = d + mse <
α−1hmrwt−1. Clearly, for α close to one this condition is implied by the condition for a fragile
state (6.6). It follows that there is a range of crisis probabilities, (1 − α) ∈ (0,1 − α), such that
if the economy is in a fragile state in period t − 1, a crisis can occur in period t with conditional
probability 1−α. Since a fragile state is only reached if the N-sector is large enough, this explains
why it may take time for the economy to reach the fragile phase.
Since the economy cannot be in a fragile state at T − 1, there must be a switch to a safe
credit market equilibrium no later than T −1. Finally, the demand shift at terminal time T (i.e. ˆ d)
must be large enough to ensure that the N-sector can repay its accumulated deﬁcits. If ˆ d were not
high enough, there would be no investment at T −1, and, by backward induction, there would be
no investment throughout. We conclude that if the N-sector has enough time to grow, the sunspot
can eventually matter and self-fulﬁlling crises can be anticipated.
6.3. Pareto optimal production
To highlight the role of bailout guarantees, we compare safe and risky equilibria. Consider
two economies A and B with parameters in the set S (deﬁned in Proposition 6.2). The only
difference between these economies is that A has systemic bailout guarantees. Then, there is
an sunspot equilibrium where A and B behave identically up to time τ − 2, after which the
N-sector in economy A grows faster and exhibits higher leverage along the lucky path, as long
as a crisis does not occur. However, A experiences a crisis and subsequent credit crunch with
positive probability while B does not. This argument implies that systemic bailout guarantees
might induce faster economic growth by easing borrowing constraints. Thus, it is not obvious
that eliminating them is desirable under all circumstances. To illustrate this point, it is useful
to characterize the set of Pareto optima. The allocation problem that has to be solved in our
economyis(i)todistributetheavailableamountofnontradablesamongconsumersandmanagers
and (ii) to efﬁciently accumulate nontradables to equate the marginal rates of substitution and
transformation. It follows that the Pareto optimal production of N-goods can be characterized by
the following law of motion:18
qt =


1 −
1 − β
1 + βT−t

ˆ d(1−β)
d − 1



θqt−1; t = 1,...,T. (6.9)
18. The key here is that only nontradables are used to produce nontradables, and only the consumer enjoys
nontradables. This means that the Pareto optimal law of motion for nontradables can be derived independently of
managerial preferences and welfare weights of different agents.20 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
The fraction of output that should be devoted to investment is thus increasing over time, and
depends positively on the anticipated preference shift ˆ d/d. Comparing (6.9) and (6.2), there is
no reason that the use of nontradables in a no-bailout regime should be Pareto optimal. There
could be too little or too much investment, depending on the ﬁnancial position of the N-sector.
Since guarantees may induce a faster growth rate of output (compare (6.2) and (6.8)), we have
that:
Corollary 6.3 (Effects of Bailout Guarantees). If the future is much brighter than the
present ( ˆ d  d), systemic bailout guarantees might bring the path of N-goods output nearer to
the Pareto optimal path.
7. AN ACCOUNT OF THE STYLIZED FACTS
In this section we relate the equilibrium time series described by Propositions 6.1 and 6.2 to
the stylized facts of Section 2. We also discuss when an economy is vulnerable to boom-bust
episodes. Figure 3 depicts the paths that an economy follows in risky and safe equilibria. The
boom starts because the ﬁnancially constrained N-sector anticipates a favourable demand shift in
the future. This encourages the N-sector to run a deﬁcit to build up productive capacity. Deﬁcits
are ﬁnanced by borrowing from abroad. Growth is gradual, as borrowing constraints are relaxed
only through the reinvestment of proﬁts. The price of N-goods rises throughout the boom: a real
appreciation leads to more demand by the N-sector for its own goods, which in turn leads to
greater appreciation and so on. In contrast, the T-sector does not face ﬁnancing constraints: its
growth is determined by investment opportunities (that grow at a constant rate). This asymmetry
in the growth patterns of the N- and T-sectors generates three regularities associated with lending
booms:anappreciatingrealexchangerate,aswellasincreasingcredit-to-GDPandN-to-Toutput
ratios. Query 5
Absent bailout guarantees and adverse exogenous shocks, this transition period will simply
see the fast growth of the N-sector. If guarantees are present, their interaction with balance sheet
effects both strengthens the boom and creates endogenous risk. On the one hand, guarantees
alleviate the underinvestment problem usually associated with constrained agents. They permit
high leverage with debt denominated in T-goods (a currency mismatch), and hence faster credit
and output growth. On the other hand, the stock of T-debt eventually becomes high enough so
as to permit self-fulﬁlling crises. Crises entail both real depreciation and widespread defaults in
the N-sector; they trigger a bailout of lenders to that sector. Importantly, crises are not merely
ﬁnancial, but have substantial output costs: in the crisis period internal funds and investment
demand collapse. Subsequently, balance sheet effects permit only a slow recovery of credit and
a decline of credit-to-GDP and N-to-T output ratios. This provides an account of a complete
boom-bust episode.
Who is to blame (1): guarantees and contract enforceability. A key ﬁnding of this
paper is that the interaction of contract enforceability problems and systemic guarantees creates
the fragility required for self-fulﬁlling crises. If there were no guarantees, ﬁrms would not be
willing to take on price risk. Costly enforceability of contracts would still imply that the N-
sector can grow only gradually and balance sheet effects could play a role during the lending
boom. However, there would be no force that makes a boom end in a crisis. In contrast, if there
were only guarantees but no enforceability problems, then there would not be any balance sheet
effects that make demand backward-bending, a necessary condition for a sunspot to matter.
There is an interesting nonlinearity in the relationship between the parameter h, which
measures the contract enforceability problems, and the fragility of the economy. On the oneSCHNEIDER & TORNELL 21
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hand, if the diversion cost is too large, risky equilibria do not exist. In this case, at the level
of the individual ﬁrm, a credit constraint would not arise. Balance sheet effects are then absent
and crises cannot occur. In other words, our crisis mechanism cannot work in countries where
there are no asymmetries in ﬁnancing opportunities and the N-sector is well integrated into
international credit markets. On the other hand, if h is very small, balance sheet effects are not
strong enough (ηt < 1). This precludes the existence of lending boom equilibria, whether safe or22 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
risky. Obviously, countries in which agents have very little access to international credit markets
should not be expected to exhibit booms, and are therefore immune to crises.
Who is to blame (2): ﬁnancial liberalization and a rosy future. In our model, booms
cannot occur in just any economy with bailout guarantees and enforceability problems. It is also
necessary to have “good news” about the future value of N-goods. Otherwise the N-sector would
notbeabletorepaytheaccumulateddeﬁcitsitrunsduringthelendingboom.Backwardinduction
then dictates that the sequence of returns that supports the lending boom would collapse. This
suggests that booms are likely to occur during a transition period following a reform or a ﬁnancial
liberalization. During the boom the N-sector expands in anticipation of a future increase in
demand.
Note that even if the reform also increases anticipated T-sector productivity, we should
still expect an increase in the N-to-T output ratio. Financially unconstrained T-ﬁrms will not
increase investment until the productivity increase materializes, whereas constrained N-ﬁrms
begin investing immediately. This is because N-sector ﬁrms can only grow by gradually building
debt capacity.19 Note also that even if the reform leads to an ongoing productivity growth in the
T-sector, the N-to-T output ratio may still increase. Suppose T-sector productivity gt grows at
rate λ. The unconstrained T-sector’s investment and output then also grow at rate λ. In contrast,
the constrained N-sector’s investment and output grow at an increasing rate. This implies that as
long as λ is not too large, the N-to-T output ratio will eventually increase if the boom goes on
long enough.
No exogenous shocks and no money. We consider an economy with no exogenous
uncertainty. This is in contrast to explanations of crises that are based on the premise that
emerging economies suffer from larger exogenous shocks than other countries. Moreover, we
consider a non-monetary economy. This clariﬁes that neither money nor nominal rigidities are
necessary for crises to occur. Furthermore, a real model ﬁts well with the fact that the boom-bust
cycle does not differ signiﬁcantly under ﬁxed and non-ﬁxed exchange rate regimes.
How likely is a crisis?. Our model implies that even during a transitional period the
likelihood of a self-fulling crisis is not a free parameter. If crises were not rare events,
the production of N-goods would not be a positive NPV undertaking. This implies that an
equilibrium with binding borrowing constraints would not exist. If internal funds are initially
low, crises cannot occur during the initial phase of a boom. It is only after the boom has gone
long enough that fragility arises. The size of the possible downturn becomes more severe, as the
anticipated event that triggered the boom draws near.
In our model lending booms need not end in crisis. Instead a boom can end in a soft landing.
In a safe equilibrium the ﬁnancial structure is not fragile. Meanwhile, in a sunspot equilibrium
there must be a switch from a risky to a safe phase before terminal time. Thus, if the boom lasts
long enough there is a soft landing.
8. LITERATURE REVIEW
There are a number of “third generation” crisis models that have invoked ﬁnancial market
imperfections to explain crises.20 These models are typically based on one of two distortions:
19. If there were time-to-build constraints or investment adjustment costs in the T-sector, this result would be less
stark. However, it would still be valid if these adjustment costs were smaller than the ﬁnancial adjustment costs faced by
the N-sector.
20. The Mundell–Fleming framework and traditional BoP crisis models are not appropriate for explaining these
new boom-bust episodes, because credit plays no essential role in these models. In the standard Mundell–Fleming model,SCHNEIDER & TORNELL 23
either “bad markets”, in the form of an imperfection that generates borrowing constraints, or
“bad policy”, in the form of bailout guarantees. To our knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst to
rationalize a complete boom-bust episode, and to formally study bailout guarantees and contract
enforceability problems in a uniﬁed framework.21
Beginning with Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) balance sheet
effects have been at the heart of a large literature in macroeconomics.22 Recent applications in a
two sector, open economy context include Aghion, Bachetta and Banerjee (2000a) and Caballero
and Krishnamurthy (2001). In Aghion, Bolton and Dewatripont, T-goods are produced using
a country-speciﬁc factor, which is nontradable. In their setup it is the T-sector the one that is
constrained by net worth, and there are no bailout guarantees. An increase in T-sector net worth
relaxes borrowing constraints, and drives up the input price. As T-sector wealth builds up, the
second effect gains strength. Thus, there comes a time when the real appreciation spell comes
to an end and there is a drastic real depreciation. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) consider
a three-period, two-sector economy with credit constraints. They also single out the N-sector
as having more difﬁculties in obtaining external ﬁnance. They show that N-sector ﬁrms do not
have incentives to hedge against future uncertainty and that in a crisis, shocks can get propagated
across sectors and ampliﬁed through collateral prices. In contrast to our story, exogenous shocks
are essential for crises to occur. Query 6
Bailout guarantees have been prominent in discussions of the Asian crisis. Corsetti et al.
(1999); Krugman (1998) and McKinnon and Pill (1987) emphasize the role of guarantees for
over-investment and the behaviour of asset prices. Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2001)
consider a one-sector economy and show that guarantees discourage agents from hedging
their foreign currency exposure. Self-fulﬁlling devaluations are possible because a devaluation
transforms government’s contingent liabilities into actual liabilities and depletes government
reserves.
In terms of the “crisis mechanism”, the papers most related to ours are Calvo (1998) and
Krugman (1999). They also argue that, with risky debt denomination, balance sheet effects can
be responsible for self-fulﬁlling meltdowns. In contrast to our work, they simply assume the
existence of foreign currency denominated debt and credit constraints.
Following Obstfeld (1986), a number of papers have described crises in models with
multiple equilibria. Chang and Velasco (1998) and Cole and Kehoe (1997), emphasize
coordination problems among lenders in the presence of short term debt. In these models,
lenders refuse to roll-over debt because they fear others may also refuse to do so. Although
this coordination failure can also occur in our model, it is distinct from the self-fulﬁlling real
depreciations we emphasize in this paper.
There are no banks in our model. The credit chain is subsumed in a single borrower–lender
relationship. Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) have modelled how the capital of the banking system
constrains lending and hence spills over to bank-dependent ﬁrms and constrains their investment.
The role of banks in the spread of crises has been analysed by Diamond and Rajan (2000), and
Aghion et al. (2000b). In the ﬁrst paper enforceability problems imply that the only way illiquid
investments can be ﬁnanced is through domestic banks, which in turn must borrow short-term. A
crisis occurs when an exogenous productivity shock forces early liquidation. This precipitates a
when there is a capital outﬂow the needed improvement in the current account can be attained with a real depreciation
and with no output costs. According to this view, a depreciation induces a shift of resources from the nontradable to the
tradable sector, and makes the economy more competitive in world markets. As a results growth resumes fast after the
depreciation.
21. In Schneider and Tornell (1999) we consider an economy with these two distortions and exogenous shocks,
and focus on the behaviour of prices of ﬁxed-supplied assets (i.e. real estate).
22. For a survey see Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (2000).24 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
meltdown of the banking sector and generates a credit crunch. The second paper shows that while
the elimination of systemic guarantees reduces moral hazard and thus the likelihood of individual
bank insolvencies, it ampliﬁes the effect of a systemic shock through contagious bank runs.
9. CONCLUSION
In the late 1980s several middle income countries implemented far reaching reforms that reduced
the size of the government sector and promoted the rapid growth of the private sector. These
reforms were associated with large increases in credit to the private sector. As a result, the
well-known balance of payments (BoP) crises associated with ﬁscal and monetary imbalances
were superseded by “new” boom-bust cycles in which credit, currency mismatch, and bailout
guarantees took center stage.
In this paper we have shown that boom-bust cycles can be generated by the interaction of
two characteristics of ﬁnancing typical of middle income countries. First, there is an asymmetry
in ﬁnancing opportunities across sectors. While the T-sector has access to several sources of
external ﬁnance, the N-sector faces enforceability problems. Second, lenders enjoy systemic
bailout guarantees. One distinctive feature of this paper is that excessive risk taking and credit
constraints arise simultaneously in equilibrium. This is because in our setup systemic bailout
guarantees do not neutralize the contract enforceability problem.
A second distinctive feature is that both credit risk and real exchange rate risk arise
endogenously. We do not assume real exchange rate risk by introducing shocks to fundamentals,
and we do not assume credit risk by imposing currency mismatch. Instead, in our model, real
exchange rate risk is translated into credit risk by the optimal currency mismatch chosen by the
N-sector. In turn, credit risk translates into real exchange rate risk because self-fulﬁlling crises
can occur if there is currency mismatch. Thus, the existence of both credit risk and real exchange
rate risk is self-reinforcing.
A third distinctive feature is that bailout guarantees are not just a nuisance. In our model
eliminating them does not unambiguously lead to an improvement in economic outcomes. Since
there is a ﬁnancial friction, there is an interesting trade-off: guarantees could increase the growth
rate, but they make the economy vulnerable to self-fulﬁlling crises. Under some circumstances
bailout guarantees bring the resource allocation nearer to the Pareto optimal one. This reﬂects
the fact that in the model lending booms reﬂect not only excessive risk taking. Instead, booms
are episodes during which borrowing constraints are eased following events that make the future
look brighter than the present.
A fourth distinctive feature is that the results were obtained in a real model. This shows that
the particulars of the nominal exchange rate regime are irrelevant to explain the characteristics of
a boom-bust cycle. It might well be the case, for example, that a speciﬁc nominal exchange rate
regime blocks certain transmission mechanisms. However, this does not mean that the candidate
regime has gotten rid of the boom-bust cycle: the cycle might simply appear under a different
guise. This result ﬁts well with the fact that the boom-bust cycle does not differ signiﬁcantly
under ﬁxed and non-ﬁxed exchange rate regimes.
Finally, faster productivity growth in the T-sector is often invoked to rationalize the long-
run real appreciation observed in countries that have experienced substantial income growth (the
Balassa–Samuelson effect). This effect does not explain the coexistence of real appreciation and
an increasing N-to-T output ratio that is typically observed during lending booms. Our model
can explain this stylized fact because there is a self-reinforcing mechanism in the N-sector.SCHNEIDER & TORNELL 25
APPENDIX
A1. The credit market game
We establish two versions of Propositions 4.1 and 4.2. The versions in the text assume that prices are given and α goes
to one for given prices. To prove the results in Section 6, we will need two more general Propositions 4.1∗ and 4.2∗ that
assume a set of conditions involving both α and prices. The link between the two sets of propositions is provided by the
following (obvious) lemma.
Lemma A1. If condition (4.1) is satisﬁed, and α is close to one, the following conditions hold:
Positive net present value: Re ≡ peθ/p ≥ (1 + r) (A.1)
Bound on the low return: R ≡ pθ/p < h/α (A.2)
Bound on the high return: ¯ R ≡ ¯ pθ/p < h/α(1 − α) (A.3)
Parameters’ restrictions: α > max{βh,1 − βh} (A.4)
Positive net return in the high price state: ¯ R ≥ [1 + r]/α. (A.5)
As a preparation for the proof of Propositions 4.1∗ and 4.2∗, we now consider the problem faced by an individual
manager, given other managers’ strategies. It is helpful to introduce three random variables. Let ζt+1 = 1 indicate
whether the ﬁrm is solvent ( πt+1 ≥ 0), and let δt = 1 indicate whether there is no diversion. Other managers’ strategies
enter only through their effect on bailouts. We assume that a bailout occurs in the bad state only. Let φt+1 denote a
random variable that is equal to F in the bad state and equal to zero in the good state, where F ∈ {0,1} is the fraction of
claims paid to lenders in a bailout. The manager’s problem, for given F, can now be written as (we will drop time indices
and use hyphens to refer to the next period):
Problem P(F). Given prices (p, p, ¯ p), choose a plan (I,sn,s,bn,b,ρn,ρ,δ,ζ0) that maximizes 5 = E(δζ0 ˆ π +
[1 − δ][G0ζ0 − h[w + b + bn]) subject to the budget constraint (3.2), and the lenders’ break-even constraints
(1 + ρt)Et[δtζt+1 + (1 − δtζt+1)φt+1] ≥ 1 + r,
(1 + ρn
t )Et[pt+1(δtζt+1 + (1 − δtζt+1)φt+1] ≥ 1 + r.
Next period’s proﬁt in a state with price p0 is given by
ˆ π(p0) := p0θI + (1 + r)s + (1 + rn)p0sn − (1 + ρn)p0bn − (1 + ρ)b. (A.6)
We solve this problem in three steps. First, Lemma A2 determines the best “safe plan”, that is, the best plan such
that the ﬁrm is solvent in both states of the world (ζ0 ≡ 0). Second, Lemma A3 determines the best “risky plan”, that is,
the best plan such that the ﬁrm is solvent in the good state only. Lemma A4 then determines the optimal plan over all.
Lemma A2 (Best Safe Plan). Suppose α ≤ 1. If conditions (A.1) and (A.3) hold, the best safe plan does not lead
to diversion. It satisﬁes s = sn = 0 and pI = msw := 1
1−βhw. Optimal debt denomination keeps the share of tradables
debt γ = b
b+bn below a threshold. In particular, it is always weakly optimal to denominate all debt in nontradables. The
interest rates satisfy: ρ = r and 1 + ρn = [1 + r]/pe.
Proof. The best safe fundable plan (I,s,sn,b,bn,ρ,ρn) that does not lead to diversion maximizes
5s,nd = α(pθI + (1 + r)s + (1 + r)p(pe)−1sn − (1 + ρ)b − (1 + ρn)pbn)
+(1 − α)(pθI + (1 + r)s + (1 + r)p(pe)−1sn − (1 + ρ)b − (1 + ρn)pbn),
subject to the budget constraint (3.2), the borrowing constraint
(1 + ρn)pebn + (1 + ρ)b ≤ h[pI + s + sn], (A.7)
the solvency constraints ˆ π( ¯ p) ≥ 0, ˆ π(p) ≥ 0, and the lenders’ break-even constraints
1 + ρ ≥ 1 + r, (1 + ρn)pe ≥ 1 + r. (A.8)
It is clearly optimal to set ρ = r and 1 + ρn = 1+r
pe . Condition (A.1) implies that sn > 0 cannot be optimal, since
N-bonds are dominated in rate of return by investment. Similarly, we cannot have θI < (1 + ρn)bn at the optimum.
If this was the case, both I and bn could be reduced, strictly increasing proﬁts and relaxing all constraints. But if26 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
θI ≥ (1+ρn)bn, the solvency constraint for the high price state is implied by that for the low price state, which is given
by ˆ π(p) = pθI +(1+r)s+(1+r)p(pe)−1sn −(1+ρ)b−(1+ρn)pbn ≥ 0. It then follows that b = 0 is optimal: the
two types of debt and the two types of storage are exchangeable in the objective and in all constraints except for the low
price state solvency constraint, where T-debt is more expensive. It is thus weakly better to replace all b with bn. We can
now reformulate the problem as choosing (I,s,bn) to maximize ( peθ
p −(1+r))pI +(1+r)w, subject to the borrowing
and solvency constraints

1 −
h
1 + r

(pI + s) ≤ w,

1 −
peθ
p(1 + r)

pI +
 
1 −
pe
p
!
s ≤ w.
Since peθ ≥ (1+r)p (by (A.1)), the solvency constraint is irrelevant and optimal investment is pI = w
1−βh. This
yields a payoff equal to ¯ 5s,nd = peθp−1−h
1−βh w.
We now show that the best safe, fundable plan that leads to diversion cannot yield a proﬁt higher than ¯ 5s,nd.
This plan maximizes proﬁts subject to the requirement that the no-diversion constraint (A.7) does not hold, and
ˆ π( ¯ p), ˆ π(p) ≥ 0. Since we just want to bound the payoff, we ignore (A.7). Imposing it cannot increase payoffs. We
then know that the interest rates should be set as low as possible to relax the solvency constraints, which can now be
written as
ˆ π( ¯ p) = pθI + (1 + r)s + (1 + r)p(pe)−1sn −
1 + r
(1 − α)φ
b −
1 + r
(1 − α)φ
p
p
bn ≥ 0,
ˆ π(p) = pθI + (1 + r)s + (1 + r)p(pe)−1sn −
1 + r
(1 − α)φ
b −
1 + r
(1 − α)φ
bn ≥ 0.
Without loss of generality, we can set bn = 0. Moreover, the constraint for the bad state implies the one for the good
state. We thus reformulate the problem as maximizing (pep−1θ − h)pI + (1 + r − h)s + (1 + r − h)sn subject to
(1 − βpp−1θ(1 − α)φ)pI + (1 − (1 − α)φ)s + (1 − p(pe)−1(1 − α)φ)sn ≤ w.
The shadow costs multiplying the portfolio choices in the constraint are positive. For the shadow cost of investment, this
follows from (A.3), and it is obvious for T-bonds. In addition, (A.1) implies that the shadow cost of N-bonds is higher
than that of investment and so the former must be positive also.
Since investment has a higher marginal beneﬁt (but a possibly higher shadow cost than T-bonds), it is not clear
what the preferred instrument is. We can concentrate on plans that satisfy the constraint with equality and bound the
payoff by showing that for both the plan with I = sn = 0 and that with sn = s = 0, the payoff is lower than
¯ 5s,nd. For the former plan we have ¯ 5s,d ≤ 1+r−h
1−(1−α)φw < (1 + r)w ≤ ¯ 5s,nd. The second inequality uses the
fact that α > 1 − βh and the third inequality follows because setting s = w is a fundable safe plan. For the plan
with sn = s = 0 we have ¯ 5s,d ≤ pe p−1θ−h
1−βpp−1θ(1−α)φw, which is less than ¯ 5s,nd by (A.3). Finally, we consider
the optimal debt policy. We already know that any plan with bn = pI − w (γ = 0) is optimal. The remaining
question is whether there are other plans with b > 0 and b + bn = pI − w. We need only check whether these
plans satisfy the solvency constraint ˆ π(p) = pθ − (1 +r)γ(pI − w) − p 1+r
pe (1 − γ)(pI − w) ≥ 0. This is equivalent
to γ < γ = min
n
pe
p θ − h

pe
p
h
p − h
−1
,1
o
. k
Lemma A3 (Best Risky Plan). Suppose α < 1. If conditions (A.1)–(A.4) hold, then
1. If (A.5) holds, there exists a best risky plan. In this plan there is no diversion, s = sn = 0 and pI = w
1−α−1βh.
2. If (A.5) does not hold, the proﬁt from risky plans is bounded above by (1 + r)w.
3. If (A.5) holds and bailout guarantees are present (F > 0), all debt is T-debt.
Proof. Parts 1 and 2. As a ﬁrst step, we determine the best risky fundable plan that does not lead to diversion. In
the second step we will show that the best risky fundable plan with diversion is less proﬁtable.
Step 1. The best risky fundable plan with no diversion maximizes α ˆ π( ¯ pt+1) subject to the budget constraint (3.2),
the lenders’ break-even constraints, as well as the riskiness requirement,
1 + r ≤ (1 + ρ)(α + (1 − α) F), 1 + r ≤ (1 + ρn)(αp + (1 − α) F p), (A.9)
ˆ π( ¯ p) = pθI + (1 + r)s + (1 + r)p(pe)−1sn − (1 + ρ)b − (1 + ρn)pbn ≥ 0, (A.10)
ˆ π(p) = pθI + (1 + r)s + (1 + r)p(pe)−1sn − (1 + ρ)b − (1 + ρn)pbn < 0. (A.11)SCHNEIDER & TORNELL 27
Without loss of generality, the break-even constraints can be taken to be binding. Suppose one of them was slack at the
optimal plan. We could then reduce the interest rate: proﬁts are not decreased (they go up if debt is positive) and all
constraints would still hold. Interest rates are thus
1 + ρn =
1 + r
αp + (1 − α) F p
, 1 + ρ =
1 + r
α + (1 − α)F
. (A.12)
We ﬁrst show that bn > 0 cannot be optimal. For any policy involving bn > 0, we can construct an alternative policy
by increasing b slightly and decreasing bn by the same amount. Since [1 + ρn]p < 1 + ρ < [1 + ρn] ¯ p, the alternative
policy must yield higher expected proﬁts and still satisfy all the constraints. Note also that the proﬁt is strictly increased
if F > 0. Therefore, F > 0 implies bn = 0.
A risky plan with s > 0 can never be optimal. Suppose to the contrary that s > 0 is optimal. Then we can reduce
slightly s and b by the same amount, strictly increasing the expected payoff (note that b > 0 must hold at the initial plan
by the insolvency constraint). This leads to strictly higher proﬁts (since ρ ≥ r). The borrowing constraint is unaffected.
The insolvency constraint still holds if the change is small enough, since it held with strict inequality at the original plan.
This is a contradiction.
Setting bn = s = 0, we can reformulate the problem as that of choosing (I,sn) to maximize
α

pθ
p
− (1 + ρ)

pI + α

p(1 + r)
pe − (1 + ρ)

sn + α(1 + ρ)w, (A.13)
subject to the borrowing and insolvency constraints

1 −
1
α (1 + ρ)
h

(pI + sn) ≤ w, (A.14)

1 −
pθ
p(1 + ρ)

pI +

1 −
p(1 + r)
pe(1 + ρ)

sn > w. (A.15)
By (A.1), the net return on physical investment in the objective is higher for funds invested in the technology than for
investment in N-bonds. In addition, by (A.4), (A.14) imposes an upper bound on total funds invested.
Suppose that (A.5) does not hold. Then the net return on both investment opportunities is negative. It follows that
there does not exist a best risky plan that does not lead to diversion and that the proﬁt from all risky plans is bounded
above by (1+r)w. Otherwise, if (A.5) holds, the investment expenditure that maximizes (A.13) subject to (A.14) only is
pI = w
1− 1
α (1+ρ)h
= w
1−βh

1+1−α
α F
. Finally, (A.2) implies that this solution also satisﬁes the second constraint. We
have found the optimal no-diversion-plan under (A.5). The expected payoff of this plan is ¯ 5r,nd = αθ p p−1−h
1− h
α(1+ρ)
· w.
Step 2. Consider now the best risky, fundable, diversion plan. Such plans maximize 5r,d = α[pθI+(1+r)s+(1+
rn)psn] − h(pI + s + sn), subject to budget constraint (3.2), the riskiness requirement (A.10)–(A.11), the requirement
that the no-diversion constraint does not hold, and the break-even constraints,
(1 − α)φt+1(1 + ρt) ≥ 1 + r, (1 − α)φt+1(1 + ρn
t ) pt+1 ≥ 1 + r. (A.16)
The debt choices enter only through the solvency and budget constraints. By a similar argument to that above, we can set
bn = 0 without loss of generality. Our goal is to bound the payoff under a diversion plan. We thus ignore the no diversion
condition and (A.11). Imposing them will, if anything, make this payoff even lower. It is then optimal to set the interest
rate as low as possible and to use the break-even constraint for T-debt holding with equality. We solve the problem of
choosing (I,s,sn) to maximize
[αpp−1θ − h]pI + [α(1 + r) − h]s + [α(1 + r)p(pe)−1 − h]sn,
subject to (3.2), (A.16) and the insolvency constraint:
(1 − βpp−1θ(1 − α)F)pI + (1 − (1 − α)F)s + (1 − p(pe)−1(1 − α)F)sn ≤ w.
This problem has a solution because the three terms (shadow costs) multiplying the portfolio choices in the constraint are
positive. For the shadow cost of investment, this follows from (A.3), α > βh and F ≤ 1. It follows trivially for T-bonds.
Finally, (A.1) implies that the shadow cost of N-bonds is higher than that of investment, so that this shadow cost must be
positive also.
By (A.1), the marginal beneﬁt of investment is higher than that of either type of bond, and the shadow cost of
investment is lower than that of T-bonds. The best plan must thus involve as much investment as possible, such that the
insolvency constraint binds. This yields an upper bound on the payoff of ¯ 5r,d ≤ αθ pp−1−h
1−βpp−1θ(1−α) · w. It then follows28 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
that if (A.5) does not hold, then ¯ 5r,d < (1 + r)w. In contrast, if (A.5) holds, then a best risky no diversion plan exists
and (A.3) implies ¯ 5r,d < ¯ 5r,nd.
Part 3. Consider the optimal debt policy. We have already shown in Step 1 that under the optimal non-diversion
plan it is strictly optimal to have bn = 0 if F = 1. Since the optimal non-diversion plan is the overall optimal plan, this
proves Part 3. k
Lemma A4 (Optimal Plan). If conditions (A.1)–(A.4) hold, then:
1. If F = 1, the optimal plan (i.e. the solution to the managerial decision problem P(F)) is the best risky fundable
plan (characterized in Lemma A3).
2. If F = 0, the optimal plan is the best safe fundable plan (characterized in Lemma A2).
Proof. If α = 1, then the concept of a risky plan is not deﬁned. It follows that the best safe plan is the optimal
plan. Suppose instead that α < 1. Consider ﬁrst the case F = 0. If (A.5) does not hold, then the optimal plan cannot be a
risky plan, since, by Lemma A3, the best risky plan yields less than (1+r)w. If (A.5) holds, we know from Lemmas A2
and A3 that a best safe plan and a best risky plan exist. From the proofs of these lemmas, payoffs are 5s := peθp−1−h
1−βh w
and 5r = αpθp−1−h
1−βh(1+1−α
α F)
w, respectively. It is clear that a safe plan is preferred if F = 0.
For F = 1, (A.5) is implied by (A.1). Hence, both a best safe plan and a best risky plan exist. Using the deﬁnition of
pe, we obtain after some algebra that 5r > 5s if and only if pθp−1 < α−1h peθp−1−h
1+r−h . We know that pθp−1 < α−1h
by (A.2), and the fraction on the R.H.S. is greater than one, by (A.1).
We have shown that a safe plan dominates if F = 0 or α = 1, while a risky plan dominates if α < 1 and F = 1.
The only task left is to rule out plans that are neither safe nor risky. Plans that lead to insolvency in both states yield
zero proﬁt and are obviously inferior. Consider a plan that leads to solvency in the bad state and insolvency in the good
state. For such a plan, positive proﬁts accrue only in the bad state and the plan satisﬁes at least the budget constraint and
ˆ π( ¯ p) < 0, ˆ π(p) ≥ 0. Since we want to bound the payoff, we ignore constraints related to diversion. It cannot be optimal
to have either I,sn or b positive (since investment and N-bonds are dominated by T-bonds in return in the low price state,
while N-debt is strictly more expensive than T-debt in that state).
Since lenders have to break even, (1 + ρn)(1 − α)pF ≥ 1 + r. Also, T-bond holdings have to satisfy
s(1 − (1 − α)F) ≤ w. Proﬁt are bounded by gross returns on T-bonds, which are in turn bounded above by
(1 − α) 1+r
1−(1−α)F w. With F = 0, this is clearly inferior to the best safe plan. The same is true for F = 1, because
α > 1
2 by (A.4). This concludes the proof k
Having solved the problem P(F) for an individual manager, we are now ready to prove the main propositions.
Proposition 4.1∗. If conditions (A.1)–(A.4) hold, then the implications of Proposition 4.1 are true.
Proof. In a world without guarantees, managers’ choices are not interdependent. Every manager simply solves the
problem P(0) deﬁned at the beginning of this Appendix. Lemma A4, part 2 says that the solution to this problem is the
best safe fundable plan, which is characterized in Lemma A2.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. By Lemma A1, conditions (A.1)–(A.4) hold for α close enough to one. Thus
proposition 4.1∗ applies k
For risky equilibria, we proceed as in the safe case. We state a proposition for general α, and then invoke
Lemma A1.
Proposition 4.2∗. If conditions (A.1)–(A.4) hold, then the implications of Proposition 4.2 are true.
For F > 0, the feasible plans in problem P(F) are exactly those that are fundable if everybody else chooses a risky
plan. A risky plan is part of a symmetric equilibrium if and only if it solves P(F). Indeed, any risky plan that is feasible
in P(F) but is not a maximizer can never be part of a symmetric equilibrium. Suppose it was, then a bailout would be
expected in the good state, so an individual entrepreneur could choose any plan from the feasible set and have it funded.
He could thus simply pick the maximizer. Conversely, we can construct an equilibrium from any risky maximizer of
P(F). Now since conditions (A.1)–(A.4) hold, Proposition A4 implies that under the maintained assumptions, there is a
risky plan that solves P(F) if and only if F = 1. We can read off the properties of such a plan from Lemma A3. kSCHNEIDER & TORNELL 29
Proof of Proposition 4.2. By Lemma A1, conditions (A.1)–(A.4) hold for α close enough to one. Thus
Proposition 4.2∗ applies. k
A2. Dynamics
Proof of Proposition 6.1. Part 1. We need to show that, under the conditions of the proposition, there is a solution
(qt,wt) to (6.2)–(6.4) which satisﬁes the positive NPV condition on prices. It is clear that there is a solution for every
set of initial conditions. Along this solution, ptθ > (1 + r)pt−1 for all t < T and pTθ > (1 + r)pT−1 if and only
if wt−1 > βd
cms =: e1 for t < T − 1 and wT−1 < β(1 − βh) ˆ d. Moreover, for t < T, wt > wt−1 if and only if
wt−1 >

1
1−c − 1−h
1−βh
−1
d =: e2. We have e2 > 0 because ηs > 1 implies c < βh. Let
e = max
(
β
cms ,

1
1 − c
−
1 − h
1 − βh
−1)
· d, (A.17)
and let wt(e0) denote the solution of an economy starting at w0 = e0 > e. This solution increases over time. Finally, to
ensure wT−1 < β(1 − βh) ˆ d , let ˆ d > d(e0,T) = β−1(1 − βh)−1wT−1(e0).
Part 2. We show that it holds at t if and only if wt−1 > wp, wt−1 > wq, and wt−1 > wc for appropriately chosen
lower bounds wp,wq and wc. Since wt is increasing over time (by Part 1), this implies Part 2. For prices, we have that
pt > pt−1 for t < T along a solution if and only if ms(ηsh−θ(ηs −1))wt−1 > d. Condition θ < ηsh/(ηs −1) implies
that the term multiplying wt−1 is positive. Thus, the lower bound is wp := d[msηsh −msθ(ηs −1)]−1. For output, we
have that N-output is increasing (qt > qt−1) when wt−1[ms(θ − 1)] > d. Thus, qt > qt−1 if and only if θ > 1 and
wt−1 > wq := [ms(θ − 1)]−1d. For the N-to-T output ratio, since T-output grows at rate λ and ptqt = d + mswt, it
follows that
ptqt
yt
>
pt−1qt−1
yt−1
⇐⇒
wt
wt−1
> λ + d ·
λ − 1
mswt−1
. (A.18)
Equation (6.3) implies that (A.18) holds only if λ < ηsh/(ηs − 1). Since ηs > 1, we know from (6.3) that wt/wt−1 is
increasing in wt−1. Thus, there is a lower bound wc such that the inequality in (A.18) holds if and only if wt−1 > wc.
Finally, for the credit-to-GDP ratio, note that, along a solution, credit is bt +bn
t = mshwt and GDPt = yt + ptqt. Using
the market clearing condition and pt It = mswt,
bt+bn
t
GDPt >
bt−1+bn
t−1
GDPt−1 ⇐⇒ [ms−1]wt
[ms−1]wt−1
> yt+d+mswt
yt−1+d+mswt−1
⇐⇒
wt
wt−1 > d+yt
d+yt−1 . Since the R.H.S. is lower than yt
yt−1 = λ, the last inequality holds if (A.18) holds and wt−1 > wc.
k
Proof of Proposition 6.2. Parts 1 and 2. We begin by constructing a candidate “lucky path” on which no crisis
occurs. Pick an e0 > e, where e is given by (A.17), and let wt(e0) denote the solution to the safe equilibrium difference
equation (6.3). Select τ such that τ − 1 is the smallest t such that wt(e0) satisﬁes (6.6). We will construct a path where
(qt,wt) evolve according to a safe equilibrium until time τ − 2, and then according to a risky equilibrium until T − 1.
The last step, from T − 1 to T, is again according to a safe equilibrium. For any T, we can deﬁne a lucky path as the
unique solution, for given w0 = e0 and q0, to
qt = θ
mt−1wt−1
mt−1wt−1 + d
qt−1 for t ≤ T,
1 − ηt
1 − c
wt = d − ξt−1mt−1wt−1 for t < T, and wT = ˆ d − hmswT−1.
where for t ≤ τ −2, we have mt = ms,ηt = ηs and ξt = h. Meanwhile, for t = {τ −1,...,T −2},mt = mr,ηt = ηr
and ξt = α−1h. To prove that this path is an equilibrium, we need to show that for t = {τ − 1,...,T − 2}, conditions
(A.1)–(A.3) hold with p = pt, p =
d+mt+1wt+1
qt and p = d+ems
qt . If this is the case, the transition from t to t + 1 is
indeed consistent with a risky equilibrium. Similarly, we have to show that for t ≤ τ − 2 and t = T − 1 (A.1) holds, but
for α = 1. Some algebra reveals that (A.1) holds at time t if and only if

αξt−1
ηt
ηt − 1
− β−1

mt−1wt−1 ≥ α
d(1 − c)
ηt − 1
− (1 − α)
d
1 − mtµe
. (A.19)
Conditions (A.2) and (A.3) hold along the candidate path if and only if
ξt−1mt−1(1 − mtµe)wt−1 ≥ d, and (A.20)
 
α−1h
1 − α
mt−1 −
ξt−1ηt−1
ηt − 1
mt
!
wt−1 ≥
−d
ηt − 1
. (A.21)30 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
We also have that wt > wt−1 along the candidate path if and only if
(1 − ηt + ξt−1ηt−1)wt−1 > (1 − c)d. (A.22)
If α → 1, all lower bounds for wt−1 required by (A.22) converge to a number smaller or equal than e (in (A.17)). Since
w0 > e, it follows that, for α close enough to one, wt is increasing over time. Similarly, the lower bounds required
by (A.19) converge to a number smaller or equal than e. It follows that (A.19) holds for every t if α is close to one.
Moreover, (A.20) holds at time τ for α close to one, because wτ−1(e0) satisﬁes (6.6) by construction. Since wt is
increasing, (A.20) then holds for all t, up to T − 1. If α is close enough to one, the term multiplying wt−1 on the L.H.S.
of (A.21) is positive. This implies that (A.21) holds for all t. We have thus ensured that the candidate solution is consistent
with a risky equilibrium in t = {τ −1,...,T −2}· To ensure that the path is consistent with a safe equilibrium in period
T − 1, we pick ˆ d large enough such that ˆ d > d(e0,α,T).
Part 3. We follow the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 6.1. During any time τ < t < T −1, the economy
is in a risky equilibrium. Thus, we have that pt > pt−1 if and only if wt−1 > wp(α) := d/mr[ηrhα−1 − θ(ηr − 1)]
and θ < ηrh/α(ηr − 1). Second, for N-output we have that qt > qt−1 if and only if θ > 1 and wt−1 > wq(α) :=
d/mr(θ −1). Third, the N-to-T ratio increases if and only if λ < ηrh/α(ηr −1) and wt/wt−1 > λ+d[λ−1]/mrwt−1.
These conditions imply that the credit-to-GDP ratio increases, like in the proof of Proposition 6.1. Since wt and wt/wt−1
are increasing in the safe phase, they will continue to be so in the risky phase because ηr > ηs and mr > ms. It follows
that Part 3 is established by picking a sufﬁciently big lower bound on T (i.e. T(e0,α)).
Part 4. Consider the case where t ∈ {τ,...,T −1} is a crisis period. When a crisis occurs, internal funds revert to
wt = e < wt−1. Since qt > qt−1 for t ≥ τ, we have pt ≤ d+mse
qt <
d+mrwt−1
qt−1 = pt−1, so that a crisis involves a real
depreciation. Finally, we know from Proposition 6.1 that, if e > e, a safe equilibrium with positive investment exists. In
this equilibrium
qt+1
qt = θ mse
d+mse < 1 under the stated condition. k
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